Due Process in Criminal Courts Martial by Editors, Law Review
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL COURTS MARTIAL
Logically it would seem that the protection of the Bill of Rights would extend
as well to the members of the armed forces as to their civilian compatriots. Al-
though the court martial system is set up under Article I, Section 8 of the United
States Constitution' while the federal court system is set up under Article 111,2
this in no way implies that while the latter is subject to such limitations as the
Fourth through Eighth Amendments the former is unaffected by any portion of
the Constitution. On the contrary, while the Constitution does not authorize
direct review in the federal courts of court martial convictions, it does make
such convictions subject to attack by habeas corpus under Article I, Section 9.3
Further indication of the limitations imposed upon the court martial system by
the Constitution is shown in the Fifth Amendment, where it was thought neces-
sary to state explicitly that the requirement of grand jury indictment did not
apply to the armed forces. The implication of this one exception is that the un-
excepted portions of the Amendment do apply.4 Since the power of courts mar-
tial is admittedly limited by the availability of habeas corpus to upset their con-
victions, how can it be said they are immune from due process?
The United States Supreme Court has said just this by way of dictum, how-
ever: "American citizens conscripted into the military service are thereby
stripped of their Fifth Amendment rights."' In cases concerning court martial
convictions of United States citizen members of our armed forces, some federal
courts have acted as if this statement were a valid expression of the law concern-
ing all court martial decisions.6 Since courts martial are tribunals of limited
jurisdiction whose judgment carries no presumption of validity,7 collateral at-
tack on their judgments has allowed the civil courts at least to question their
jurisdiction.8 The cases denying to servicemen the constitutional rights enjoyed
by all other citizens are based on a narrow concept of "jurisdiction," under
which the only facets of the court martial into which the civil courts may in-
quire are whether the defendant was subject to military law, 9 whether the of-
1 In Clause 14, Congress is authorized "To make rules for the government and regulation
of the land and naval forces."
2 See Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 53 (2d ed., 1896).
3 Clause 2. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 2 (1866).
4 See Sanford v. Robbins, 115 F. 2d 435, 438 (C.A. 5th, 1940).
6 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950) (trial by military tribunal of enemy
alien war criminals).
5 The most extreme statement of this position was made by the Court of Military Appeals,
speaking of due process. "[W]e do not bottom those rights and privileges on the Constitution.
We base them on the laws as enacted by Congress," and "we need not concern ourselves with
the constitutional concepts." United States v. Clay (No. 49), 1 C.M.R. 74, 77, 79 (C.M.A.,
1951).
7 Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 555-56 (1887).
8 McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49 (1902).
9 In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
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fense was cognizable by court martial,10 whether the tribunal was properly con-
vened," and whether the sentence was within its authority to impose. 2 These
cases conflict with the basic notion that "due process," in criminal cases at
least, is the right of all Americans.
As a result of this conflict, confusion exists regarding the permissible scope of
habeas corpus attack upon court martial convictions. The best exposition of
this confusion comes in the connected cases of Anthony v. Hunter" and Arnold
v. Cozart.14 Petitioners, codefendants in the same court martial, had been sen-
tenced to serve in different penitentiaries and had therefore petitioned different
district courts on habeas corpus. Anthony was released on the ground that im-
proprieties in his pretrial investigation" had constituted a denial of due process;
it was taken for granted that habeas corpus could free one thus unconstitution-
ally convicted. Arnold, on the other hand, was curtly remanded to custody on
the theory that such improprieties did not deprive the court martial of jurisdic-
tion. Although the conflict in these cases most directly concerned the importance
of the pretrial investigation," it was also involved with the larger question of
due process as a whole.
More widespread evidence of the conflict between due process and the sanc-
tity of court martial decisions appears in other current cases. A selective reading
of these cases might lead to the conclusion that lack of due process in a court
martial would clearly be grounds for the voiding of its judgment by a civil court
on habeas corpus. The leadership along this road has been taken by the lower
federal courts. Shapiro v. United States 7 held that a court martial decision would
not be respected where defendant was notified of the charges only eighty min-
utes before trial and was convicted less than five hours later. Beets v. Hunter"'
freed petitioner because he had been defended at the court martial by incompe-
tent and unwilling counsel. In Hicks v. Hiatt," had the case not been mooted
by the army's returning defendant to duty, habeas corpus would have voided
a highly irregular court martial. Even when the facts of the case have not been
10 Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S. 416 (1922).
11 United States v. Brown, 206 U.S. 240 (1907).
12 Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902).
"3 71 F. Supp. 823 (D. Kan., 1947).
1475 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Tex., 1948).
15 Under Article of War 70, 41 Stat. 802 (1920), a pretrial investigation was required for
general courts martial.
16 It has now been held not jurisdictional in Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949).
17 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl., 1947).
18 75 F. Supp. 825 (D. Kan., 1948). The case was reversed without prejudice on failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Hunter v. Beets, 180 F. 2d 101 (C.A. 10th, 1950), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950). On review under Article of War 53, 62 Stat. 604 (1948), the mili-
tary review board held petitioner's allegations unfounded and opined that the district court had
not been presented with all the facts by respondent warden. In re Beets, JAGY CM 296265,
[1949-50] Memo. Ops. JAG Army 392.
1"64 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa., 1946).
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such as to warrant release, the courts have asserted their right to grant relief in
appropriate cases. 0
The Supreme Court also has spoken as if accepting in principle the idea that
habeas corpus lies to free the victim of an unconstitutionally unfair court mar-
tial. It has strongly implied that denial of an opportunity to plead insanity in
a court martial would be such an unconstitutional deprivation of the defend-
ant's rights that it would void the court martial of "jurisdiction." 21 Similarly,
it has held applicable the same general rule of law as is used in the civil courts
for cases concerning necessary discontinuation of trials.22
Unfortunately, however, even though the Supreme Court has given verbal
approval to the principle of broad use of habeas corpus, it has not been willing
to put this principle into practice. In Hiatt v. Brown,23 the Court found no lack
of due process in a court martial including the following errors: (1) the defend-
ant was convicted of murder on the theory that even though he was a sentry on
post, he was under an obligation to retreat; (2) no malice or premeditation was
shown; (3) defense counsel was incompetent, gave no preparation to the case,
and submitted only a token defense. The Court appeared to ignore the facts that
had the sentry left his post he could have been court martialed under Article of
War 86; that homicide without malice or premeditation is not murder 4 save in
felony-murder cases; and that denial of effective counsel is as bad as denial of
all counsel.s In dismissing petitioner's plea, the Court appeared to accept a
narrow concept of jurisdiction. "In this case the court martial had jurisdiction
of the person accused and the offense charged, and acted within its lawful
powers. The correction of any errors it may have committed is for the military
authorities."2 If the court martial errors found in this case are to be ignored on
petition for habeas corpus, it is hard to imagine any that would be considered.
Although attempts have been made to explain away Hiatt v. Brown,27 its sig-
2 0 Schita v. King, 133 F. 2d 283 (C.A. 8th, 1943) (incompetent defense counsel and im-
proper admission of evidence would void conviction); Boone v. Nelson, 72 F. Supp. 807
(D. Me., 1947), Hayes v. Hunter, 83 F. Supp. 940 (D. Kan., 1948) (absolute failure of evi-
dence would deprive court martial of jurisdiction); Powers v. Hunter, 178 F. 2d 141 (C.A. 10th,
1949), Benjamin v. Hunter, 169 F. 2d 512 (C.A. 10th, 1948) (sentence so long as to violate
constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment would be void even if within
power of court martial). Of course there are many cases where relief would most clearly be
inappropriate, e.g., Romero v. Squier, 133 F. 2d 528 (C.A. 9th, 1943) (civilian counsel refused
access to secret military maps).
21 Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122 (1950) (but court martial upheld on facts).
22 Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690 (1949) (court martial upheld on facts). "We see no
reason'why the same broad test should not be applied in deciding whether Court-Martial
action runs counter to the Fifth Amendment's provision against double jeopardy. Measured
by the Perez rule to which we adhere, petitioner's second Court-Martial trial was not the kind
of double jeopardy within the intent of the Fifth Amendment."
23 339 U.S. 103 (1950). 244 Bl. Comm. 198.
von Moltke v. Gilles, 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
2 6 Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 111 (1950).
27 Cf. Bums v. Lovett, 202 F. 2d 335 (App. D.C., 1952).
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nificance quite clearly seems to be that lip service only will be paid to the ideal
of correcting unconstitutional court martial trials by habeas corpus. Support for
this view is contained in Burns v. Lovett,25 where the allegations of unconstitu-
tionality were at least such as to require a hearing on their veracity. Even before
Hiatt v. Brown, some of the lower courts refused to follow the path of liberalism
set out by their brethren, and took in both theory and practice the stand that
courts martial are above the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Even the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has said, "The Fifth and Sixth Amendments
are, of course, inapplicable to a court martial.129 Similar ideas have been ex-
pressed in the District Courts.3 Once the effects of Hiatt v. Brown are felt in the
lower courts, there may well be a further retrogression from the broad use of
habeas corpus.3'
Since the law is made up of precedent as well as logic, the solution to any
legal conflict should be in line with both. The solution in this case certainly
should not allow the civil courts to "virtually administer the Rules and Articles
of War, irrespective of those to whom that duty and obligation has been con-
fided" by the Constitution and pertinent statutes.33 But neither does it mean
that the Bill of Rights may be ignored. Fortunately, however, an examination
of the statutory and common-law material dealing with the court martial sys-
tem shows that the conflict, although serious, is unnecessary.
I
The background and composition of our system of military justice reveals
that twvo distinct categories of offense render the soldier who commits them li-
able to trial. One category, the "disciplinary," encompasses offenses relating to
the functioning of the army as an efficient and unified organization: offenses
whose gravamen lies in their effect upon the service as a whole rather than upon
those directly concerned.3 4 Such cases, therefore, are put solely and fully under
the court martial jurisdiction of those directly responsible for the successful
20 202 F. 2d 335 (App. D.C., 1952), cert. granted 73 S. Ct. 284 (1952), argued Feb. 5,
1953; (allegations of coerced confessions, suppression of evidence, unlawful detention, inter-
ference with counsel, and attempts to suborn perjury and intimidate witnesses held insufficient
to warrant a hearing).
29 United States ex rel. Innes v. Crystal, 131 F. 2d 576 (C.A. 2d, 1943), citing Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1942).
30 E.g., Ex parte Benton, 63 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Cal., 1945); United States ex rel. Marino v.
Hildreth, 61 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. N.Y., 1945); In re Wrublewski, 71 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Cal.,
1947).
31 See, e.g., Barrett v. Steele, 181 F. 2d 500 (C.A. 8th, 1950) (allegation of complete failure
of evidence disregarded as not jurisdictional). Cf. Wiener, The Uniform Code of Military
Justice 186 (1950).
'2 Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. (U.S.) 65, 82 (1858).
3 The statute now in force is the Uniform Code of Military Justice (hereinafter cited as
UCMJ), 64 Stat. 108 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 551 et seq. (1951).
34 Such offenses as insubordination, desertion, and dereliction of duty obviously strike at
the root of the organization and discipline so essential to the survival of an army.
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operation of the service 6 In these "disciplinary" cases it is quite legitimate to
say: "To those in the military or naval service of the United States the military
law is due process. 3 16 In such a tightly knit and cohesive organization as the
army, effective operation must of necessity depend on factors often considered
unimportant in civilian life. Since the sole object of a disciplinary system is to
maintain the efficiency of the service, the processes of that system must look
first to this end and only secondarily toward that preservation of individual in-
tegrity which is the aim of the common-law system.3" The fact that the elements
of military law concerning disciplinary offenses differ from the "due process" of
civil law means only that those responsible for the operation of the army have
chosen those means which their experience leads them to believe will best effect
the maintenance of discipline.38 Whatever the civil courts may think of these
procedures, such cases remain and should remain strictly under military con-
trol, for the training and experience of civil judges is not such as would enable
them to deal effectively with the problems of military discipline.
A careful examination of the basic precedents limiting the scope of inquiry
into court martial jurisdiction shows them to fall almost invariably within this
"disciplinary" category, both by the nature of the offense and by the reasons
given for upholding the courts martial. 9 Although in many of these cases con-
"[TMhe common law ... knew no distinction between citizen and soldier; so that if a
life-guardsman deserted, he could only be sued for a breach of contract; and if he struck his
officer, he was only liable to an indictment or an action of battery." 2 Campbell, Lives of the
Chief Justices 91 (1873).
36 Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304 (1911).
37 ,Thediscipline necessary to the efficiency of the army and navy, required other and
swifter modes of trial than are furnished by the common law courts." Ex parte Milligan, 4
Wall. (U.S.) 2,123 (1866).
38 The concept of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments recognizes that
different procedures may be appropriate under different conditions. See, e.g., Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
39 Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. (U.S.) 65 (1858), held that the civil courts could not void
judgment of court martial with jurisdiction; however, the offense was attempted desertion, an
act of purely disciplinary significance. Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 22 (1879), denied habeas
corpus relief to navy paymaster's clerk convicted of malfeasance, stating, "the good order and
efficiency of the service depend largely upon the faithful performance of their duties." Accord:
Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895) (embezzlement by navy paymaster's clerk). In Smith v.
Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 169, 178 (1885), a case involving "culpable inefficiency in the per-
formance of duty," the Supreme Court said: "Of questions not depending upon the construc-
tion of the statutes, but upon unwritten military law or usage, within the jurisdiction of courts
martial, military or naval officers, from their training and experience in the service are more
competent judges than the courts of common law." In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890), which
stated that civil courts could enquire only into the jurisdiction of courts martial, concerned de-
sertion by fraudulent enlistee. Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897), dismissing a suit
to recover pay forfeited under a court martial judgment, dealt with the catch-all "conduct to
the prejudice of good order and military discipline" (now UCMJ Art. 134). Carter v.
McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 390 (1902), a case of fraud against the government by army
officer, held habeas corpus would not question sentence of court martial with jurisdiction. The
Court said that the sanctity of such decisions "would seem to be essential to the maintenance
of that discipline which renders the army efficient." Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304
(1911), saying that "the decision.., of a military tribunal acting within the scope of its law-
[Vol. 20
stitutional issues were raised, they were easily disposed of either on the facts of
the case or on recognized principles of law. 40 In effect, then, all the due process
available was that which was granted by and within the military law.
Although "disciplinary" courts martial are generally upheld, this does not
mean that the denial by courts martial of substantive constitutional rights will
otherwise be permitted, for although the language used in the "disciplinary"
cases is often general, it must nevertheless be read in the full context of the
facts and holdings of those cases in order to constitute binding precedent.
II
The other category of offense, the "criminal," is concerned with civil crimes
committed by servicemen. 4' The offenses encompassed here are those which
have only an ancillary effect upon the service and primarily concern the persons
directly involved. Since these are the deeds of individuals in relationship to
other individuals, rather than those of members of an organization in relation-
ship to that organization, few problems are raised concerning the special effect
of such deeds upon the service. While it is true that any action of a serviceman
reflects to some degree upon his uniform, the effect of his civil crimes upon the
internal efficiency of the service is slight0--despite public-relations headaches.'s
Therefore, since these offenses are of the type normally dealt with by the crimi-
nal courts, and since no such problems of discipline are raised as would justify
trial by other than the traditional common-law methods, the offenders are gen-
erally turned over to the civil authorities.44
ful powers cannot be reviewed," held inviolable the findings of board of examiners convened
to determine mental and physical qualifications of junior officers. French v. Weeks, 259 U.S.
326 (1922), and Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336 (1922), also upheld military tribunals deter-
mining capacity and fitness for command.
40 Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886) (right to jury trial preserved but not expanded
by Sixth Amendment); Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902) (double jeopardy dis-
posed of on facts of case); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895) (grand jury indictment un-
necessary at any time for "cases arising in the land or naval forces" by the plain words of
the Fifth Amendment); Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 (1911), French v. Weeks, 259 U.S.
326 (1922), Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336 (1922) (military law constitutes due process re-
garding proper procedure for administrative board).
41 This category consists of offenses committed other than in the line of duty, such as
robbery of a civilian. Insofar as a criminal act also constitutes a substantial breach of disci-
pline, it could legitimately be considered in the "disciplinary" category. See note 44 infra.
4 Since "criminal" offenses do not strike directly at the organization, their effect on it is
limited to the loss of the offender's services during his confinement, plus the desire to emulate
such offence roused in other members of the service. However, a proper trial is sufficiently
likely to convict the guilty and is as good a deterrent as an improper trial, which is more
likely to convict the innocent.
43 The fact that all members of a clearly defined minority group are blamed for the bad
deeds of a few of their number does not give such a group the right to go beyond the criminal
law in policing its own members.
44 At first glance, it would seem that Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696, 698, 699 (1881), was
an exception to this rule, since it concerned a court martial trial of the attempted murder of a
civilian by a soldier. However, the case had an immediate and direct disciplinary significance,
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The first Articles of War, promulgated in 1775, 41 limited court martial power
over crimes committed by members of the armed forces to the trial of those acts
which actually affected good order and military discipline; 46 in such cases the
military and the local civil courts had concurrent jurisdiction. In 1776, this con-
current jurisdiction was specifically set forth in the Articles of War,47 giving the
civil courts "if not a supremacy of jurisdiction, at least a primary power to pro-
ceed against military offenders violating the civil law."' 48 Later, again by stat-
ute,49 courts martial were specifically given power over various nondisciplinary
crimes committed in wartime. Prior to this statute such crimes apparently "had
not in practice been treated as within the grant of authority to deal with them
as prejudicial to good order and military discipline."5 Insofar as courts martial
were used for the trial of soldier-criminals the reason was not to supplant the
local criminal laws but to aid in their enforcement when, for any reason, the
local courts might be unable to act upon the offender."'
The civil courts' "primary power to proceed" against soldier-criminals in
peacetime was for a long time absolute; the early Articles of War unqualifiedly
required military commanders to surrender civil offenders to the local authori-
ties upon proper demand. 2 In 1916, this requirement was modified to keep with-
in army jurisdiction those offenders against whom court martial action was al-
ready being or had been taken. 3 Article of War 92 categorically forbade trial by
court martial for murder or rape committed in the United States in peacetime.54
The effect of the foregoing Articles of War was to give the soldier-criminal in
most cases a civil trial necessarily conforming to the accepted civil standards of
due process; the reason for those articles presumably lay in "the known hostility
of the American People to any interference by the military with the regular ad-
since the intended victim was a prisoner under the defendant's guard. "[S]hooting by a soldier
of the army standing guard over a prison, with intent to kill a prisoner confined therein, is
not only a crime against society, but an atrocious breach of military discipline." Moreover,
even here the civil courts would have been given jurisdiction had they taken any steps to
proceed against the offender. See also Neall v. United States, 118 Fed. 696 (C.A. 9th, 1902).
41 J. Cont. Cong. 90 (1775). These Articles and the material used in notes 47-54 infra
and accompanying text are taken in large measure from Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376
(1920), and Winthrop, op. cit.supra note 2, at 11-15.
11 Cf. Re Stubbs, 133 Fed. 1012 (C.C. Wash., 1905) (soldier shot and wounded a comrade
while on duty).
47 1 J. Cont. Cong. 435, 482 (1776).
48 Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 382 (1920). 49 12 Stat. 736 (1863).
50 Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 383 (1920).
51 Ibid., at 386. The local courts might be closed because of the existence of martial law or
military operations. Winthrop, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1033.
12 Code of 1776, Art. 1, § 10, 1 J. Cont. Cong. 435, 482 (1776); Arts. 33, 99, 2 Stat. 359
(1806); Art. 59, Rev. Stat. § 1342 (1878).
53 Art. 74, 39 Stat. 662 (1916). Cf. McKittrick v. Brown, 337 Mo. 281, 85 S.W. 2d 385
(1935).
14 41 Stat. 787 (1920).
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ministration of justice in the civil courts."55 Under the new Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 56 however, surrender of an offender to the civil authorities is
not made mandatory by statute, but is left dependent upon administrative
regulations. 7 Moreover, there is a group of criminal cases where the offender
must necessarily be tried by court martial, but where his right to the protection
of due process should remain-criminal offenses by United States servicemen
in foreign countries."8 Our courts have always taken the view that such cases
must be tried by court martial rather than by the foreign courts.59 Yet, although
such crimes have a somewhat greater disciplinary significance than if committed
at home, they appear to remain basically within the "criminal" category." The
large number of American servicemen now stationed overseas, plus the fact that
the Code makes the major civil crimes court martial offenses,"' means that the
soldier-criminal no longer has the same rights as before to a civil trial with its
concomitant of due process. Only by insisting on due process in criminal
courts martial can the courts create equivalent rights. Since the services, of neces-
sity, strive for uniformity, this may well result in an extension of due process
by the armed forces to "disciplinary" courts martial as well-a not undesirable
result.
The contrast between the traditional treatment of "criminal" offenses, which
were seldom left to court martial when a civil court was available, and that of
"disciplinary" cases, where sole and complete court martial jurisdiction has
never been challenged, reinforces the conclusion that these two basic categories
do exist within the court martial field.62 By making use of these categories, the
conflict between "due process" and the precedent-based inviolability of court
martial decisions can be resolved. Now that a hundred years of precedent based
on the exigencies of maintaining military discipline have sealed off the,"disci-
plinary" cases from substantial interference by the civil courts, the military
must there be trusted to temper efficiency with justice. The criminal cases, how-
5 Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 514 (1878). See also United States v. Matthews,
49 F. Supp. 203 (M.D. Ala., 1943).
5 Op. cit. supra note 33.
57UCMJ Art. 14. The present regulations state as a matter of policy that civil offenders
should be surrendered unless the best interest of the service would be prejudiced thereby.
Army Regs. 600-320 C 1. Cf. Wiener, op. cit. supra note 31, at 5, 62-63.
58 Of course such combat offenses as looting are purely disciplinary.
59 Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch (U.S.) 116 (1812).
60 See text and notes at notes 42 and 43 supra. In addition, one of the finest aspects of Ameri-
can life is the system of justice that gives every man a fair trial-this we should not fear to
reveal to both friend and foe in other lands.
1, UCMJ Arts. 118-31. See also Wiener, op. cit. supra note 31, at 21-22; Index and Legis-
lative History of UCMJ, House Hearings 1237 ff.
62 Contemporary recognition of the dichotomy is contained in both American and British
legal periodicals: Holtzoff, Administration of Justice in the U.S. Army, 22 N.Y.U. L.Q.Rev. 1,
2 (1947); Griffith, Justice and the Army, 10 Modem L. Rev. 292, 300-303 (1947).
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ever, have always been subject in one way or another to a large measure of
civilian influence. Since no valid reason exists for removing this influence, it
would seem appropriate that it be exercised through a standard of collateral at-
tack requiring the same due process for court martial trial of soldier-criminals
as is necessary in the civil trial of all criminals.
Such an extension of due process is suggested by Grafton v. United States:3
Congress, by express constitutional provision, has the power to prescribe rules for the
government and regulation of the Army, but these rules must be interpreted in connec-
tion with the prohibition against a man's being put twice in jeopardy for the same of-
fense. The former provision must not be so interpreted as to nullify the latter.
Or, as was more recently stated:6 4
We think this basic guarantee of fairness afforded by the due process clause of the
fifth amendment applies to a defendant in criminal proceedings in a federal military
court as well as in a federal civil court. An individual does not cease to be a person
within the protection of the fifth amendment of the Constitution because he has joined
the nation's armed forces.
The decisive rejection of writs of certiorari and prohibition as means of col-
lateral attack8 has left habeas corpus as the major weapon for overturning court
martial judgments in the civil courts.6 The writ of habeas corpus remains sub-
ject to the limitation that it will not, in general, support consideration of the
guilt or innocence of the accused or the procedure at the trial, but will lie only
to determine the "jurisdiction" of the court.67 The concept of jurisdiction in
civil cases, however, appears to have been expanded to include substantial com-
pliance with the constitutional rights of the accused.
In the federal civil court system it is settled by clear statutory mandate that
habeas corpus will free the victim of an unconstitutionally conducted trial."8
The tie-in between constitutionality and jurisdiction was well expressed in
Johnson v. Zerbst: 9
A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost "in the course of the proceed-
ings" due to failure to complete the court ... by providing counsel for an accused....
If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer
has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without
63 206 U.S. 333, 352 (1907). See also Sweeney v. Hiatt, 89 F. Supp. 416 (N.D. Ga., 1949).
64 United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F. 2d 664 (C.A. 3d, 1944).
" In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (1900); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886); cf. Winthrop,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 55-60.
66 Suit in the Court of Claims for forfeited pay is another remedy. Shapiro v. United States,
69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl., 1947).
67 Petitioner must first have exhausted his other remedies. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128
(1950). And habeas corpus will only free one held in physical as against moral restraint. Wales
v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885). Nor can habeas corpus grant an honorable or void a dishonor-
able discharge. Miller v. Commanding Officer, 57 F. Supp. 884 (N.D. Tex., 1944).
68 14 Stat. 385 (1867), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(c)(3) (1950). In re Nielson, 131
U.S. 176, 182 (1889).
69 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
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jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas
corpus.
Even in the sphere of federal-state court relations,
the use of the writ [of habeas corpus] in the federal courts to test the constitutional
validity of a conviction for crime is not restricted to those cases where the judgment
of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It extends
also to those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the con-
stitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of pre-
serving his rights.70
Therefore, it seems clear that habeas corpus review of unconstitutional civil
trials has become an accepted method of protection for the victims of such
trials. Even where (state) corrective judicial procedure is provided for, federal
habeas corpus action will serve to correct error made therein with regard to the
constitutional question.
7
'
The question of what constitutes a denial of due process in "criminal" court
martial cases is one that can be answered only on the facts of each individual
case.
72
As applied to a criminal trial [in State courts under the Fourteenth Amendment] denial
of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very
concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it we must find that the absence of
that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality
as necessarily prevents a fair trial.73
This differs from the rule set forth in Reaves v. Ainsworth7 4 that "to those in the
military or naval service of the United States the military law is due process."
This does not necessarily indicate a conflict, for the Articles of War and military
precedents require, in theory at least, all elements essential to fairness.,' How-
ever, even if there were such a conflict, constitutional considerations should
take precedence over even the broad wording-as distinguished from the nar-
row holding-of the Reaves case. The Supreme Court has held the constitutional
right to counsel dependent not on the normal (state) procedures, but on the fun-
70 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-5 (1942).
71Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
7 Many of the elements of an unconstitutional trial have been recognized and proscribed
in holding or dicta by the Supreme Court in habeas corpus attack on both state and federal
convictions. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (testimony known by prosecutor
to be materially perjured); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941) (absence of counsel unless
intelligently waived); von Moltke v. Gilles, 332 U.S. 708 (1948) (plea of guilty obtained by
trickery); in re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (secret trial); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949)
(coerced confession); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob hysteria); Pyle v. Kansas,
317 U.S. 213 (1942) (suppression of favorable evidence); Ex parte Nielson, 131 U.S. 176
(1889) (double jeopardy).
73 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). Cf. Lewis v. Sanford, 79 F. Supp. 77, 78
(N.D. Ga., 1948); Kuykendall v. Hunter, 187 F. 2d 545 (C.A. 10th, 1951).
4 219 U.S. 296, 304 (1911).
71 See, e.g., UCMJ Arts. 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, 46, 97, 98.
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damental fairness notions of due process.76 Of course the basic uncertainty as to
what facts actually amount to a denial of fundamental fairness does much to
confuse the issue of just when habeas corpus should lie, but once the courts ac-
cept the principle that an unconstitutional court martial will not be respected,
fixing the details of what constitutes a fatal defect will not be difficult.
IV
In conclusion, it seems that much of the confusion and uncertainty concern-
ing habeas corpus review of "criminal" courts martial can be removed without
violating either precedent, justice, or logic. There are clearly two categories of
court martial offense, "disciplinary" and "criminal." The unique factors re-
quiring trial under military standards of due process affect only the former-in
the latter the basic factors are those also extant in civil trials. Although the lan-
guage of the basic precedent cases is often general, examination of their facts and
holdings shows that they almost invariably fall within the "disciplinary" cate-
gory, and are not on their reasoning applicable to "criminal" cases; thus the lat-
ter may be decided on the same logical grounds as criminal due process cases in
the civil courts, unaffected by the precedents which so greatly limit collateral at-
tack on "disciplinary" convictions. Courts martial, although separate from the
civil court system, are not exempted from the Bill of Rights, and the expanded
writ of habeas corpus is widely used to void unconstitutional convictions. There-
fore, not only should it be uneasily stated that habeas corpus can free the victim
of an unconstitutional court martial; it should be firmly stated as the rule and
so held in appropriate cases.
76 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
SHAM MARRIAGES
In the recent federal case of Untited States v. Lutwak,' several aliens and Amer-
ican citizens were prosecuted for conspiring to violate Sections 180a and 220(c)
of Title 8 of the United States Code,2 each of which provisions forbids obtain-
ing entry into the United States by willfully false or misleading representations,
statements, or documents required by the immigration laws; and for defrauding
the United States of its governmental functions and its immigration laws. Three
American citizens had participated in marriage ceremonies with the aliens in
order that the latter would be eligible for admission into the United States under
the War Brides Act of 1945.1 Upon a finding that the parties had agreed not to
1195 F. 2d 748 (C.A. 7th, 1952), aff'd, Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
2 45 Stat. 1551 (1929), 8 U.S.C.A. § 180a (1942), makes it a misdemeanor to obtain entry
into the United States by a willfully false or misleading representation or the willful conceal-
ment of a material fact. 43 Stat. 165 (1924), 8 U.S.C.A. § 220(c) (1942), provides for a maxi-
mum fine of $10,000 or a maximum imprisonment for five years or both for knowingly making
under oath any false statement, affidavit, or other document required by the immigration
laws or regulations prescribed thereunder.
'59 Stat. 659 (1945), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 232-36 (Supp., 1952), dealing with admission of alien
spouses and minor children of citizen members of the armed forces during World War II.
'[Vol. 20
